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Economists typically evaluate policies based on how such policies affect individuals’ utilities. 
We follow this approach by taking a welfarist view of the USA’s espoused policy of 
promoting liberty in other parts of the world. However, we take a nuanced view by 
investigating the type of welfare that the USA promotes. On one hand, we identify a direct 
value of liberty in the sense that basic human rights like freedom of speech, freedom to 
express one’s religious beliefs, and freedom to form associations improve welfare. In this 
case, liberty is directly consumed. We argue that this improvement in welfare comes simply 
from giving people greater levels of freedom and is independent of the existence of other 
inputs. On the other hand, we identify an indirect value of liberty because liberty is indirectly 
consumed insofar as it is an input in an economy’s production function and therefore affects 
welfare through its effect on an economy’s capacity to produce goods and services. However, 
unlike the direct effect mentioned above, we argue that liberty alone cannot produce this 
indirect effect and therefore needs complementary inputs like investments in physical and 
human capital. We identify foreign aid as a source of information for investigating a donor’s 
direct and indirect values of liberty. In our empirical work, our identification strategy exploits 
the aforementioned difference in the characteristics of the direct and indirect values of liberty 
to test whether the USA's foreign aid allocation is motivated by a direct value or and/or an 
indirect value for liberty. As a test of validity, we apply our methodology to the aid allocation 
of donors who, we believe, are different from the USA. These are Arab donors and 
Scandinavian countries (i.e., Sweden, Norway, and Denmark). We also include the UK. 
JEL-Code: F350, H870, I380. 
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“My fellow citizens of the world, ask not what America will do for you, but what 
together we can do for the freedom of man.” – John F. Kennedy, inaugural address, 
January 20, 1961. 
 
“Human rights is the soul of our foreign policy, because human rights is the very soul 
of nationhood.” – Jimmy Carter, remarks on the 30th anniversary of Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, December 1978. 
 
“We will encourage reform in other governments by making clear that success in our 
relations will require the decent treatment of their own people. America’s belief in 
human dignity will guide our policies ...” – George W. Bush,  inaugural address, 




In standard economics, only actions or outcomes affect payoffs. Intentions, 
intrinsic values, or procedural utility are irrelevant. This explains why economists 
typically evaluate policies based on how such policies affect individuals’ utilities. Yet 
there are clearly situations where actions or the final outcome are not the only things 
that matter to people. The same action might induce different payoffs depending on 
the intentions of the person who took the action. For example, the action of taking 
another person’s life yields different payoffs to the perpetrator depending on his/her 
intention. This accounts for the well-known legal distinction between murder and 
manslaughter.
1
                                                 
1 Psychological game theory pioneered by Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stachetti (1989) departs from the 
standard approach by modelling the payoffs of players in a game as function of actions (outcomes) and 
the intentions of their opponents. 
 Andreoni (1989, 1990) used an intrinsic value (i.e., the warm glow of 
giving) to explain why government transfers do not fully crowd out private charitable 
contributions and why per capita voluntary contributions to a public good does not 
become arbitrarily small as the number of contributors gets very large. Another type 
of intrinsic value (i.e., the expressive value of voting) has been used to explain why 
people vote in large elections, although their vote is unlikely to change the outcome of 
   2 
the election.
 2
The models in the aforementioned papers follow a welfarist approach in the sense 
that agents are assumed to care about things like the warm-glow of giving, distributive 
justice, and anticipation because these things affect their welfare. These elements are 
explicitly incorporated into utility functions. In contrast, there is a different approach 
to the evaluation of social policy that assigns independent weights to things like 
fairness and distributive justice, regardless of their effect on welfare.  This approach 
referred to as non-welfarist is consistent with deontological ethics or deontology 
which focuses on the intentions or the rightness of actions such as rights, duties, etc as 
opposed to the consequencies of these actions. Sen’s (1970) well-known paradox 
captures the tension between these two views wherein the protection of individuals’ 
liberties can violate the Pareto principle.
 Kreps and Porteus (1978) have argued that individuals may have an 
intrinsic value for feelings of positive anticipation and Caplin and Eliaz (2003) argue 
that people may avoid instrumental information (e.g., the result of a free HIV test) 
because they derive an intrinsic disutility from anticipating a bad outcome. Recently, 
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Corneo and Fong (2008) have incorporated an 
intrinsic value (disutility) for distributive (in)justice in an economic model. And using 
survey data, Corneo and Fong (2008) found that Americans have an intrinsic value for 
distributive justice.  
3
 
 This tension is also evidenced in the debate 
over whether the utilitarian approach to law and social policy is appropriate (see, Sen 
and Williams, 1982; Tribe, 1985; Kaplow and Shavell, 2002).  
                                                 
2 See, for example, Schuessler  (2000) and Carter and Guerette (1992). 
3Kaplow and Shavell (2001) argue that Sen’s paradox is not due to the protection of individuals’ 
liberties but rather to a restriction on individuals’ liberties to contract or make side payments. Seen in 
this way, there is arguably no paradox. Kaplow and Shavell (2001) also show that the notion of 
intrinsic goods (i.e., attaching importance to factors other than the effects of policies on individuals’ 
utilities) violates the Pareto principle. To be sure, this result is self-evident given the definition of 
intrinsic goods.   3 
In his critique of utilitarianism, Hahn (1982, p. 188) notes that  
“[A] social state is not fully described by me if I am only given the utilities of the 
agents in that state. I also need to know the liberty enjoyed by them. It follows that 
my ranking of social states cannot be of the form of the social welfare function whose 
arguments are only the utilities of individuals. If the utilitarian asks me why I should 
care about liberty over and above what is already recorded in the utility function, I can 
answer that, for me, liberty is an intrinsic good just as for him utilities are intrinsic 
goods.” 
 
Frank Hahn is not alone. To be sure, there are other people for whom liberty is 
an intrinsic good. For example, Rawls (1971), in his famous critique of utilitarianism, 
and Sen (1985) advanced the concepts of primary goods and capabilities respectively  
both of which include liberty as an intrinsic good. However, there are also others who 
only care about liberty in an instrumental sense insofar as liberty enhances the welfare 
of a society. This is the welfarist view . In the context of  economic development, the 
welfarist
4
“… state capacity would seem to be much more important than either rule of law or 
democracy, particularly at low levels of per capita GDP (i.e., below $1000). Neither 
South Korea during the 1960s or 70s, nor China from the period 1978-present, had a 
strong rule of law; property rights were partial and insecure, and there was a weak 
legal infrastructure in both countries. They, did, however possess strong 
developmental states that maintained political order and pursued pro-developmental 
rather than predatory policies. Their growth rates were not worse than territories like 
Hong Kong or Singapore that inherited modern rule-of-law systems from the British.”  
 view of liberty is captured by Fukuyama (2008, p.27-28) who notes that: 
 
Taking a more nuanced stance, Fukuyama (2008) continues: 
 
“[P]roperty rights are more important to growth than individual human rights (e.g., 
freedom of speech, association, religion) or political rights. We know of many fast-
growing regimes that offer full, partial, or quasi-property rights without protecting 






                                                 
4 Strictly speaking, Fukuyama’s view is a pro-growth view, a part of welfarism. However, the 
important point to note is that, unlike Frank Hahn, Fukuyama does not give a non-welfarist weight to 
liberty.   
5 Fukuyama’s (2008) argument is that from an instrumental point of view, economic freedom is more 
important than political or civil freedoms. We do not investigate this issue.  One of our goals is simply 
to test whether the USA believes that political and civil freedoms enhance economic welfare.   4 
Kaplow and Shavell (2001, 2002) present a strong and compelling argument 
for the welfarist approach. They also present a very sensible argument on how 
apparently non-welfarist principles can be relevant in the evaluation of policy under a 
welfarist approach. Their basic argument is that if people care about a principle, it 
must be that it affects their welfare. For example, commenting on the use of fairness 
in the evaluation of public policy, Kaplow and Shavell (2001, p. 285) argue that “... 
individuals may have a taste for an adherence to a principle of fairness; that is, their 
utilities might be higher if a policy embodies some notion of fairness ... In this case, 
the taste for fairness would be relevant under purely welfarist assessment, just as any 
other tatse would.” 
In this paper, we take a welfarist approach to the study of liberty in the sense 
that an agent values liberty only because it affects welfare. However, we take a more 
nuanced view by arguing that two distinct effects of liberty on welfare might matter to 
an agent. First, an agent might value liberty because the right to, for example, (i) 
freely form associations, and (ii) freely express one’s opinion, and (iii) freely express 
one’s religious beliefs, has a positive effect on welfare. We refer to this as the direct 
value of liberty in the sense that liberty is directly consumed. A crucial feature of this 
direct effect of liberty on welfare is that its effect is only influenced by the level of 
liberty. For example, one does not need other complementary inputs to be able to 
express one’s opinion or, at least, such inputs need not be essential. So long as one 
has been accorded the right of freedom of speech on a broader range of subjects, one 
can immediately derive some utility from it regardless of other inputs. While one 
might argue that the availability of media outlets (e.g., newspapers, the internet, radio, 
etc) enhances one’s freedom of speech, our point is that there is a basic ingredient of 
the ability to express one’s opinion that does not depend on these inputs but solely on   5 
the level of liberty. At this basic level, what matters is that one can express his/her 
opinion, for example, to a friend without the fear of being punished.
6
Second, there is, for want of a better expression, an indirect effect of liberty on 
welfare. This stems from liberty being an input into a society’s production function 
for goods and services
 In our 
theoretical model, we write down a function that captures this fact that liberty alone 
can produce some level of welfare. This allows us to emprically test if such a direct 
value of liberty, as defined here, exists. 
7,8
 “... freedom  is viewed ...  as the principal means of development.”
 Here liberty is not 
directly consumed but rather it is indirectly consumed because it is the output of 
liberty that is consumed. The distinguishing feature of this indirect effect is that 
liberty alone cannot produce the goods and services that affect welfare. Other inputs 
like investments in human and physical capital are required. If these complementary 
inputs are non-existent, the indirect effect of liberty on welfare is zero, regardless of 
its level. We call this the indirect value (instrumental value) of liberty in the specific 
sense of the ability of liberty to enhance an economy’s productive capacity. While the 
 and is consistent with Sen’s (1999, p. xii) view that 
                                                 
6Indeed, there are people who derive utility from knowing that they have the right to freely express 
their opinions and beliefs, even if they do not intend to exercise this right. This again shows that this 
value could simply stem from giving people greater levels of liberty. One might then argue that the 
direct value of liberty need not be driven by welfarist considerations. For example, a foreign aid donor 
like the USA, driven by fundamental ideological beliefs, might have a direct value for liberty in a 
recipient country independent of the effect of liberty on the welfare of the citizens of the recipient 
country. This is consistent with Kaplow and Shavell’s (2002) argument that non-welfarist  or 
deontological positions may have been inculcated in some people as a result of internalized social 
norms which makes them oblivious to the fundamental point that it is the well-being of people that 
matters.  
7The role of liberty as an input in an economy’s production function is poignantly stated by Hayek 
(1960, p. 394) as follows: “[T]he ultimate aim of freedom is the enlargement of those capacities in 
which man surpasses his ancestors and to which each generation must endeavor to add its share -- its 
share in the growth of knowledge.”  
8 There is some debate about whether democracy as captured by civil liberties and political rights has a 
positive effect on economic growth (see, for example, Barro, 1996; Wacziarg and Rodrik, 2005; and 
Persson and Tabellini, 2006). Some of this literature focuses on democratic transitions from autocracies 
as opposed to changes in the quality of democratic governance in existing democracies. Our goal is not 
to investigate whether liberty (as measured by the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties 
indices) has a positive effect on output. Our goal is to test whether the USA cares about this effect.    6 
components of this liberty can include the freedom of speech that, for example, 
facilitate the exchange of ideas, its distinguishing feature is that it requires other 
complementary inputs to enhance welfare. Therefore, something like freedom of 
speech, a component of liberty, can have two effects: a direct effect and an indirect 
effect. 
Our goal in this paper is to tease out an agent’s direct and indirect values of 
liberty or whether an agent’s observed behavior is motivated by his direct value or by 
his indirect value for liberty. Empirically, this is a difficult task because higher levels 
of liberty would typically lead to both effects. This leads to an identification problem. 
And such an investigation cannot be based on the pronouncements of the individuals 
or entities we want to study because there may be a difference between actual values 
and espoused values.  
The problem is akin to the problem of teasing out the effect of nature (i.e., the 
intrinsic attributes of an individual) and nurture (i.e., the external environment) on 
behavior. A solution is to resort to controlled lab experiments. This was the approach 
taken by Charness and Levine (2007) to their study of whether the intention behind an 
action or only the action matters to people; by Eliaz and Schotter (2007) to study 
whether people have an intrinsic value for non-instrumental information;  and by 
Casari and Luini (2007) to the study of whether individuals have an intrinsic or  
 
   7 
instrumental value for punishment.
9
We identify foreign aid as a source of information for empirically teasing out 
the direct and indirect values of liberty. Our initial argument is simple. All things 
being equal, the fact that a foreign donor is willing to transfer more costly resources 
(i.e., foreign aid) to a country if the recipient country has a higher level of liberty is an 
indication that the donor has a positive value for liberty and therefore uses foreign aid 
to reward governments that promote liberty. What is not known is whether this value 
is a direct value or an indirect value or both, as defined above. In our empirical work, 
our identification strategy exploits the aforementioned difference in the characteristics 
of the direct and indirect values of liberty to test whether a donor country’s foreign 
aid allocation is motivated by a direct value or and/or an indirect value for liberty. We 
develop a formal model and clearly elaborate on our empirical technique in section 3.  
 Another approach is to use surveys. This is used 
by Corneo and Fong (2008) in their study of tastes for distributive justice and by 
Alesina et al. (2004) in their study of tastes for inequality. 
It is important to note that the indirect effect of liberty need not only improve 
the welfare of the recipient country but could also improve the welfare of the donor. 
For example, this may be the case if a higher output of goods and services in the 
recipient country increases the profits of firms from the donor country that operate in 
the recipient country.  
 
                                                 
9Carter and Guerette (1992) also undertake an experimental study of the intrinsic value of voting.Using 
lab experiments, Dal Bo, Foster, and Putterman (2009) find that a policy designed to encourage 
cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma game is more effective when it was democratically chosen by the 
subjects than when it was exogenously impose on them. Therefore, the same policy has different 
effects depending on the process through which it was implemented. More importantly, in lab 
environment, they are able to attribute the effectiveness of the policy to democracy because they are 
able to control for selection effects which would otherwise have suggested that certain unobserved 
characteristics of subjects account for the difference in behaviour.   8 
We focus on USA foreign aid. We chose the USA because not only is the 
USA the major foreign aid donor but also the only donor country that consistently and 
publicly claims that liberty and human rights are cornerstones of her foreign policy. 
This is evidenced in the statements at the beginning of this section by presidents John 
F. Kennedy, Jimmy Carter, and George W. Bush. Of course, one cannot necessarily 
rely on these statements which is why they have to be subjected to some scrutiny. 
Our empirical analysis suggests that the USA has both a direct value and an indirect 
value for liberty.  As a test of validity, we apply our metholodogy to the aid allocation 
of donors who, we believe, are  different from the USA. These are Arab donors and 
Scandinavian countries (i.e., Sweden, Norway, and Denmark). We also include the 
UK. 
 
1.1 Clarifying Remarks 
An important point emerges from our theoretical analysis. If we are unable to 
tease out a donor’s direct and indirect values for liberty based on her foreign aid 
allocation, this does not necessarily mean that the donor does not have a direct or 
indirect value for liberty. It only means that her foreign aid allocation does not allow 
us to reach a conclusion on this issue. However, we can say that the motivation for her 
foreign aid allocation is not driven by an indirect and/or direct value for liberty. This 
will be clear in our theoretical analysis in section 3. 
While the USA is made up of heterogeneous individuals, we treat it as a single 
entity
10
                                                 
10 This is not peculiar to our study. It is applicable to all studies that try to explain the behavior of 
countries, organizations, groups, etc. 
 cognizant of the fact that her elected politicians and bureaucrats act on behalf 
of the citizens. Therefore, our reference to the USA may be interpreted as a reference 
to the USA’s decision makers. And when we claim that the USA has a direct or   9 
indirect value for liberty, we do not mean that the estimated coefficients in our 
regression are estimates of the sizes of these values. We simply mean that the USA 
has a positive value for liberty in the sense that liberty is has a direct and/or an 
indirect value.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly discusses 
the literature on foreign aid. Section 3 presents a theoretical model and the 
econometric specification. Sections 4 and 5 describe the data and present the 
econometric results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Determinants of Foreign Aid 
While this paper is primarily about the direct and indirect values of liberty, we 
nevertheless think it is appropriate to briefly discuss the growing literature on the 
determinants of the size of foriegn aid given that we use foreign data in our analysis.
11
Maizels and Nissanke (1984) undertook a study using data for eighty developing 
countries over the period 1969-70 and 1978-80. They found that the magnitude of 
bilateral donors’ aid was consistent with a “donor interest” motive, where aid was 
given for political, security, and trade interests while the magnitude of multilateral 
donor aid was consistent with a “recipient need” motive, where aid was given in 
response to shortfalls in the recipient country’s resources. Alesina and Dollar (2000) 
and Neumayer (2003) found that past colonial ties, political alliances and, to some 
extent, democracy, are major determinants of foreign aid. Kuziemko and Weker 
(2006) showed that being a rotating member of the UN Security Council has a 
positive effect on aid transfers from the USA and the UN.  
  
                                                 
11 Neumayer (2003) reviews this literature. For an interesting review of the debate on the effectiveness 
of foreign aid, see Kanbur (2006). Annen and Kosempel (2009) make an interesting and nuanced 
contribution to this literature. 
   10 
While a number of factors affect the size of foreign aid, there is some evidence 
that in recent years, a recipient’s level of political and economic governance have 
become important factors in the aid allocation decisions of some donors (Dollar and 
Levin, 2006). This is also evidenced in the Millennium Development goals (e.g., see 
Radelet, 2004 and the references therein). 
 
3. Theoretical and Econometric Framework 
We provide a theoretical model by following an approach in the foreign aid 
literature pioneered by Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) and extended by Trumbull 
and Wall (1994).
12
In Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) and its variants, aid directly affects 
welfare in the recipient country through a function referred to as the “impact 
function”. Dudley and Mortmarquette (1976, p. 134) define the impact function as the 
“consumption of the subjectively measured impact of foreign aid …” In general, it is 
a function that represents the benefit to the donor when she gives aid to the recipient 
country. In our case, we may think of the impact function as the production function 
in a recipient country.  
  
Denote the production (impact) function by H(A, L, G, Ω) for a given 
recipient country, where A is the size of the donor’s aid to a recipient country, L and 
G are the levels of liberty and investment in human capital respectively in the 
recipient country, Ω is a vector of variables such as per capita income, population, and 
imports of the recipient country. The production function is increasing and strictly 
concave in the size of aid and has the usual Inada conditions,  ∞ = ⋅ → ) ( H lim A 0 A  and 
0 ) ( H lim A A = ⋅ ∞ → , where HA ≡ ∂H/∂A is the marginal impact of aid.  
                                                 
12 The model in Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) is a single-donor model while Trumbull and Wall 
(1994) extend this model to multiple donors.   11 
Following the definition in section 1, let the monetary equivalent of the 
donor’s direct value for liberty be V(L).  
How should V(L) be different from H(L, A, G, Ω)?  Following the definitions 
of the direct and indirect values for liberty in section 1, we specify the following 
properties for V(L) and H(L, A, G, Ω):  
Property (i): V(L) = 0 if L = 0. If L > 0 and the donor has a (positive) direct 
value for liberty, then V(L) > 0
13
Property (ii): If L > 0 but G = 0 and/or Ω = 0, then H(A, L, G, Ω) = 0. 
 regardless of the values of A, G, and Ω. 
Given property (i), the fact that H(.) = 0 given G = 0 and/or Ω = 0, although  
L > 0 means that H(.) cannot capture the direct value of liberty. The production 
function H(.) captures the indirect value of liberty, as defined in section 1, if it 
satisfies H(.) = 0 given G = 0 and/or Ω = 0, regardless of the value of L. The specific 
production function we use in this paper also has the property that H(.) = 0 if A = 0, 
regardless of the values of L, G, and Ω. However, this property is not crucial. 
It is important to emphasize that thinking of the impact function as a 
production function is consistent with the interpretation that the material welfare of 
the donor is increasing in the level of foreign aid, liberty in the recipient country, and 
governance in the recipient country. For example, a country with higher levels of 
output (i.e., economic activity) may be good for firms in the donor country whose 
subsidiaries do business in the recipient country. Therefore, a higher level of 
economic activity in the recipient country is both a direct material benefit to the donor 
and the recipient. 
 
                                                 
13This direct value could be negative where, for example, greater freedom of speech gives the donor a 
disutility. However, for the sake of exposition, we assume that it is positive.     12 
Without loss of generality, ignore budget constraints.
14
1 A ˆ
 Based on his direct 
value of liberty, the donor will give an aid of size   = V(L). 
Based on his indirect value of liberty, the donor is willing to give the recipient 
an aid of size  2 A ˆ = argmaxA {H(L,A,G, Ω) − A}.  The first-order condition is 
. 1 ) , G , L , A ( HA = Ω Given strict concavity, we know that the inverse function of 
) , G , L , A ( HA Ω  exists which together with Inada conditions mean that  2 A ˆ  is unique 
and positive. Under this production function formulation, if the donor has a pro-
liberty policy, then she will give more aid to countries with higher levels of liberty 
because she believes that aid is more effective (i.e., has a higher impact) in freer 
countries. That is, ∂ 2 A ˆ /∂L = − HAL/HAA > 0, where HAL > 0. As we argue below, if 
∂ 2 A ˆ /∂L = 0, it does not mean that the donor does not have an indirect value for 
liberty. It only means that the donor’s foreign allocation aid is not influenced by an 
indirect value for liberty. 
To make any headway in empirical analysis we need to be more specific about 
the production (impact) function. Following Dudley and Montmarquette (1976), 
consider the multiplicative (Cobb-Douglas) production function
15
H(A, L, G, Ωj) = 
 used in the foreign 
aid literature:  
j
3 2 1 J
4 j j) ( G L A
α
=
α α α ∏ Ω × × × ,        (1) 
                                                 
14Consider the case of a budget constraint.  Suppose the impact function for country k is Hk(.). Then the 
donor chooses the size of aid, Ak to country k by maximizing  ∑k Hk(.) subject to ∑k Ak = B, where B is 
the budget constraint. Strict concavity of the objective function implies that each recipient country gets 
a positive amount of aid. This formulation will not significantly change the general functional form or 
the qualitative properties of the solution in (2); see, for example, Dudley and Montmarquette (1976). 
15This multiplicative production function also implies that the country cannot produce some output 
without foreign aid and/or liberty. This is not crucial because the function H(A, L, G, Ωj) + h(G, Ωj) 
will not affect our analysis,  where H(.) is as defined in equation (1) and h(.) is increasing in G and 
some components of Ωj. In particular,  2 A ˆ will remain unchanged.   13 
where Ωj represents other variables indexed by  j; ) 1 , 0 ( 1∈ α ,  j = 2,3,4, .., J. Note, for 
example, that if the impact of aid is smaller in a country with a higher per capita 
income, then the per capita income variable will have an exponent (i.e., λ) with a 
negative value in equation (1). The production function in (1) satisfies property (ii) 
above. 
Then given the production function in equation (1),  
) 1 /( 1
J
4 j j 1 2
1
j








 Ω × × α = ∏ .          (2) 
Suppressing time and country subscripts, one can estimate the parameters of 
the equation in (2) by estimating 
log(aid) =  ρ1 + ρ2log(L) + ρ3log(G) + ∑jρjlog(Ωj) + error term,      (3) 
where  ) log( ) 1 /( 1 1 1 1 α α − ≡ ρ and  ) 1 /( 1 j j α − α ≡ ρ , j = 2,3,4, .., J. In the foreign aid 
literature, it is common to estimate equations of the form in (3). Therefore, the model 
of Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) provides a micro-foundation for these 
econometric models of foreign aid allocation. 
If we strictly followed the model of Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) and its 
variants, liberty would enter the aid function only once.  The model would assume as 
in (1) that liberty has only possibly an indirect value through the production function. 
But if it is indeed the case that the donor also has a direct value for liberty then one 
cannot say that the sign of the estimate of ρ2 in (3) necessarily captures only the 
indirect value of liberty. If the donor had no direct value for liberty, then ρ2 would 
capture only her indirect value for liberty. Therefore, if indeed the donor has both a 
direct value and indirect value for liberty, then these models do not allow us to 
distinguish between which of these values influence a donor’s foreign aid allocation.   14 
In this case, we could only use such a model to investigate if the donor cares about 
liberty in her foreign aid allocation.  
Suppose αj = 0 for all j = 3, 4, …, J. This gives H(A,L) = 
2 1L A
α α . Then 
equation (2) implies that  2 A ˆ  depends on only liberty. In this case, we cannot separate 
the direct value for liberty from the indirect value for liberty nor can we tease out 
which of these values affect the donor’s aid allocation. However, we claim that it does 
not make sense for a donor to believe that the only domestic input that matters in an 
economy’s production function is liberty. For example, suppose this donor were to 
argue, like Sen (1999),
 16
H(A,L) = 
 that liberty alone can cause citizens to criticize their 
governments, make them accountable, and demand appropriate public action and thus 
affect the impact function. But such public action must necessarily involve an input 
that affects the citizens’ welfare which is precisely why the citizens would demand 
public action in the first place. This may be investment in roads, water supply, 
education, health care, energy, etc. Denoting such investments by G, the donor must 
believe that G depends on L (i.e., G(L)) and enters the production function.  So the 
donor must believe that the production function is, for example,  
3 1 )) L ( G ( A
α α . However, such a production function is not reasonable 
because it does not accommodate changes in G that are not due to changes in L. Yet 
such exogenous changes in G will have an impact on the economy’s output of goods 
and services even if L remains constant. Besides foreign aid is not the only input or 
source of revenue for any recipient country. If G has an exogenous component, Go 
and an endogenous component, G(L), then the production function can be written as 
                                                 
16 Sen (1999, p. 7) argues that “Political and civil rights give people the opportunity to draw attention 
forcefully to general needs and to demand appropriate public action. The response of a government to 
the acute suffering of its people often depends on the pressure that is put on it. The exercise of political 
rights (such as voting, criticizing, protesting, and the like) can make a real difference to the political 
incentives that operate on a government.”   15 
H(A,L, Go) = 
3 1 )) L ( G G ( A o
α α + . This means that the production function cannot be a 
function of only foreign aid and liberty. Hence, the assumption that αj = 0 for all j = 3, 
4, …, J is not reasonable. Moreover, in our data, the correlation between G and L is 
low.
17
Given that the donor has a direct value of liberty, V(L), it follows that the 
donor is willing to pay (reward) the recipient with an additional aid of size  
 Accordingly, we stick to the standard function in equation (1).  
1 A ˆ  = V(L). Then aggregate aid is A* =  2 1 A ˆ A ˆ +  which can be written as 
) 1 /( 1
J
4 j j 1
1
j








 Ω × × α + = ∏           (4) 















                    (5) 
  The first and second terms on the RHS of equation (5) are the marginal direct 
value and marginal indirect value of liberty respectively. As explained in section 1.1, 
we are not arguing that these terms represent the magnitudes of these values. They 
only indicate their existence or otherwise. 
Our goal is to structurally estimate equation (4) while specifying a functional 
form for V(L). If  ≡ η ∂ 1 A ˆ /∂L > 0,
 18
                                                 
17 We used two measures of liberty: the Freedom House index of civil liberties and the index of 
political rights. The correlation coefficient between the index of civil liberties and G, is 0.2635 and the 
correlation coefficient in the case of the index of political rights is 0.2051. 
 we conclude that the donor has a direct value for 
liberty or that her foreign aid allocation is influenced by an indirect value for liberty. 
If η = 0, our formulation does not allow us to claim that a donor does not have a direct 
value for liberty. If a donor’s foreign aid allocation is motivated by a direct value for 
liberty, then the donor has a direct value for liberty. However, the converse is not 
18Note that for a donor who believes that civil and political liberty can disrupt economic performance, it 
is possible that η < 0 and significant. Barro (1996) found that the effect of democracy on growth was 
ambiguous and could be negative in some cases. For our purposes all that matters is whether the donor 
believes that this is the case not whether this is actually the case.   16 
necessarily true.  That is, if a donor’s foreign aid allocation is not motivated by a 
direct value for liberty, we cannot necessarily claim that the donor does not have a 
direct value for liberty. If η = 0, our formulation would have allowed us to claim that 
a donor did not have a direct value for liberty if foreign aid was the only channel 
through which the donor expressed her indirect value for liberty. However, we have 
no basis to argue that this is the case. A similar argument is applicable to the donor’s 
indirect value for liberty.  
For the impact function to be strictly concave in the size of aid, we require that 
) 1 , 0 ( 1∈ α . Hence, our analysis is applicable if and only if  ) 1 , 0 ( 1∈ α . Then, in this 
case, the sign of ∂ 2 A ˆ /∂L depends on the sign of α2. Note that if αj = 0 for all  
j = 3, 4, …, J, then the indirect value component of aid given by equation (2) is a 
function of only liberty which then makes our identification technique inapplicable. 
So if and only if  ) 1 , 0 ( 1∈ α ,  α2 > 0, and αj ≠ 0 for some j, do we conclude that the 
donor has an indirect value of liberty, j = 3, 4, … J. But, as before, we cannot make 
any inference if we find that α2 = 0. 
  We fit the following model by maximum likelihood estimation: 
it
) 1 /( 1
J
4 j jt it it 1 it it
1
j




 Ω × × α + =
α − α
=
α α α ∏         (6) 
where aidit refers to the size of USA aid to recipient country i in period t, L is our 
measure of liberty represented by the Freedom House index of political rights (PR) or 
civil liberties (CL), G is investment in human capital measured as the sum of 
expenditures on education and health care expressed as a percentage of GDP, Ω is a 
vector of variables whose components are the recipient country’s per capita income   17 
and population, imports of the recipient country from the USA,
19
   
 and ε is an error 
term.  
4. Description of Data 
For our empirical investigation we use data covering the period 1990-2007 for 107 
aid recipient countries. For the dependent variable, we use real aid commitments (in 
constant 2004 dollars) to a recipient country in a given year.   
For our measure of liberty, we use two indices compiled by the Freedom House 
since 1972, namely the political rights index (PR) and the civil liberties index (CL). 
These indices are very popular and commonly used in the foreign aid literature (e.g., 
Alesina and Dollar, 2000).  The political rights index is meant to capture the extent to 
which citizens can participate in the political process by competing for public office 
and exercising their right to vote.  The civil rights index measures whether citizens 
have freedom to express their opinions and religious beliefs, form associations, and 
have overall personal autonomy without state interference.  The scores range from 1 
to 7 for both indices, where a lower score indicates a higher level of liberty. For the 
sake of convenience, we reverse the order so that higher values correspond to a higher 
level of liberty. As noted earlier, we measure investment in human capital as the sum 
of government expenditures on health and education expressed as a percentage of 
GDP. The variables in our regressions are described in Table 1 in the appendix and 
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5. Econometric results 
 
To estimate Equation (6) we use a maximum likelihood estimation technique. 
The estimation results for the USA are reported in Table 3.  We present two 
specifications, one using the Freedom House Civil Liberties index as our measure of 
liberty (column 2) and the other using the Political Rights index (column 3). First, it is 
important to note that our estimate of  1 α   lies between zero and one, which makes 
our analysis applicable. Next we focus on the estimates of the parameters  0 α  (which 
captures the direct value for liberty) and  2 α (which captures the indirect value for 
liberty). Both estimates are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
irrespective of the liberty index used. These results suggest that the USA has both a 
direct and indirect value for liberty.  
To test the validity of our methodology, we also apply it to other donors: the 
UK, Scandinavian countries (i.e., Sweden, Norway, and Denmark) and Arab donor 
countries. For example, our prior belief is that the aid allocation of Arab donors will 
not be influenced by direct or indirect values of liberty. Because previous works have 
found that Scandinavian countries tend to  allocate aid based on the economic needs 
of recipient countries
20 we expect these countries to be influenced more by an indirect 
value of liberty than by a direct value of liberty.
21
Table 4 reports the results for the UK using both indicators of liberty viz the 
civil liberty index and the political rights index. The results of the UK are similar to 
those of the USA, thus implying that the UK is influenced by the direct value of 
liberty as well as its indirect value. 
  
                                                 
20Isopi and Mavrotas (2009 find  that Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) give 
more aid to poorer countries. And Brainard (2006, p.8) states that “Norway and Denmark are lauded 
for their singular focus on development.”  
21 This is not to say that these countries do not care about the direct value of liberty but given their 
focus on poverty  they are likely to put more emphasis on a recipient's capacity to produce goods and 
services.   19 
Table 5, 6 and 7 present, respectively, results for Norway, Denmark and 
Sweden. The estimates for Norway and Denmark show that  0 α  is not statistically 
significant, while  2 α   is significant. This implies that, unlike the USA and the UK, 
these two countries have an indirect value for liberty but not a direct value; this is 
consistent with our prior belief. In the context of Sweden (see Table 7), however, the 
results appears to contradict our prior belief. indeed, the reported results exhibit 
similar pattern as in the case of the USA and the UK, thus suggesting that Sweden is 
influenced both by the direct and indirect value of liberty. 
Finally, Table 8 summarizes the results for the Arab donors. The results show 
that both the estimates of  0 α  and   2 α  are not statistically significant, hence implying 
that Arab donors are not influenced by the direct value of liberty nor by its indirect 




In economics, welfarism is a popular and important approach to the evaluation 
of social policies. In this paper, we delved into the black box of welfarism by 
developing a methodological framework to determine the nature of welfarism  within 
the context of foreign aid allocation. We applied our methodology to evaluate the 
USA’s policy of promoting liberty in other parts of the world. Taking a more nuanced 
approach, we investigated whether this policy was driven by a direct value for liberty 
stemming from effect of liberty on welfare as a result of basic human rights like 
greater freedom of speech, expression of religious beliefs, and freedom of association. 
Our analysis suggests that, the USA’s pro-liberty foreign policy is driven by this 
direct value for liberty.    20 
In addition, our analysis also suggests that the USA’s foreign aid allocation is 
also motivated by an indirect value for liberty where this value is understood to stem 
from the effect on liberty on welfare in terms of its ability to enhance an economy’s 
output of goods and services.  
To test the validity of our conceptual and empirical framework, we applied our 
methodology to other donors and obtained results that suggested that our 
methodology is able to yield results that are consistent with reasonable prior beliefs. 
One may argue that our result that the USA has a direct value for liberty is 
questionable because the USA has not promoted the cause of liberty as in basic 
human rights in places like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Zaire (under Mobutu Sese 
Seko). We have two responses to this argument. First, our analysis only gives us an 
average behavior based on the USA’s policy towards a host of countries. Therefore, 
we accept the fact that there are palpably significant exceptions to our result. Second, 
inaction does not necessarily mean that such a direct value does not exist. Such 
inaction may be due to the fact that acting on her preference for liberty is too costly 
for the USA. Our result then means that in situations where the expression of this 
preference is not too costly (i.e., giving foreign aid without jeopardizing important 
strategic goals, if any), we are able to tease out this effect.   21 
Data Appendix 
Table 1: Data definition and Source 
Variable  Definition  Source 
Aid Variables   Aid commitments (millions of 
constant 2004 dollars) 
OECD International 
Development statistics 
Income  Real GDP per capita, beginning 
of period 
 
Heston, Summers and Aten, 
Penn World Table Version 
6.2 
Population  Population in millions, beginning 
of period 
Heston, Summers and Aten, 
Penn World Table Version 
6.2 
Import  Imports from donor country by the 
recipient country 
IMF Bilateral Trade Statistics 





Total of Public Health and Public 
Education Expenditure as percentage 
of GDP 
World Development 






Table 2: Summary Statistics of USA Regression Data 
Variable  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
US Aid   97.0165  16.33797  0.01  17639.72 
Income  4897.382      5048.727     436.0691     31164.99 
Population  2.97×10
7      1.27×10
8  18999.99     1.25×10
9 
Import from USA  0.233  0.949185  0.01  12.49155 
Political rights  3.855728      2.011335            1  7 
Civil liberties  3.84644  1.579358  1  7 
Human capital 
investment 
3.774379      3.891264            0.01869391  29.46926 
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Table 3: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for USA (Dependent variable is size of 
aid) 
  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 





































No of Countries = 107 
R
2  =  0.75
 
Log likelihood = -246.982 
No of Countries = 107 
R
2  =  0.72
 
Log likelihood = -271.021 





Table 4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for  UK  (Dependent variable is size of 
aid) 
  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 





































No of Countries = 97 
R
2  =  0.42
 
Log likelihood = -204.277 
No of Countries = 97 
R
2  =  0.42
 
Log likelihood = -257.923 
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Table 5: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Norway (Dependent variable is size 
of aid) 
  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 





































No of Countries = 97 
R
2  =  0.36
 
Log likelihood = -385.670 
No of Countries = 97 
R
2  =  0.36
 
Log likelihood = -325.498 







Table 6:  Maximum Likelihood Estimates for  Denmark (Dependent variable is 
size of aid) 
  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 





































No of Countries = 74 
R
2  =  0.28
 
Log likelihood = -180.228 
No of Countries = 74 
R
2  =  0.86
 
Log likelihood = -53.968 
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Table 7: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Sweden (Dependent variable is size 
of aid) 
  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 





































No of Countries = 74 
R
2  =  0.66
 
Log likelihood = -938.892 
No of Countries = 74 
R
2  =  0.28
 
Log likelihood = -888.736 








Table 8: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Arab donors (Dependent variable is 
size of aid) 
  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 





































No of Countries = 77 
R
2  =  0.07
 
Log likelihood = -353.791 
No of Countries = 77 
R
2  =  0.08
 
Log likelihood = -353.318 
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